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INTRODUCTION  
arious sources throughout the world, primarily the mass media 
and nongovernmental organizations, routinely publish reports on 
the conduct and circumstances of states. These reports shape states’ repu-
tations in the eyes of individuals, publics, organizations, and govern-
ments. While most reporting may be presumed accurate, disinformation 
inevitably finds its way into the international public domain.1 Whether 
such disinformation is a product of biased agendas, interests of political 
actors, omissions of relevant details, or merely a matter of honest mis-
takes, it might do injustice to the states concerned. 
Several examples show that this phenomenon does not discriminate 
among states on the basis of political orientation. According to false, or 
at least questionable, allegations voiced in the past, Bolivia had an  
astonishing rate of infant deaths (2007);2 Iran forced non-Muslims resid-
ing in its territory to wear identification patches (2006);3 Iraq killed  
Kuwaiti babies in hospital incubators (1990)4 and held weapons of mass 
destruction (2003);5 Israel carried out a massacre in Jenin refugee camp 
(2002);6 the U.S. military employed nerve gas during the Vietnam War (a 
report published in 1998)7 and its interrogators at Guantánamo Bay 
flushed a Koran down a toilet (2005);8 and the Uzbek police tortured a 
person to death (2004).9 From this list, we may reasonably assume that 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Colin B. Picker, Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A Comparative 
Review of United States and Canadian Trade Actions, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 67 (2004). 
 2. Press release, UNICEF Bolivia Office, UNICEF Bolivia Clarifies Information on 
Infant Mortality Published by Amnesty International (May 23, 2007). 
 3. Douglas Kelly, Our Mistake: Note to Readers, NAT’L POST, May 24, 2006, at A2, 
available at http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=6df3e493-f350-4b53-bc16-
53262b49a4f7. 
 4. WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
“A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” 347, 575 (1998). 
 5. Michael Gordon, Bush Enlarges Case for War by Linking Iraq with Terrorists, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 2003, at A1. 
 6. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, JENIN: IDF MILITARY OPERATIONS 4 (2002), availa-
ble at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/israel3/israel0502.pdf; UN Says No Massacre in Jenin, 
BBC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2165272.stm. 
 7. CNN Retracts Tailwind Coverage, CNN, July 2, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/ 
US/9807/02/tailwind.johnson/#1. 
 8. Katharine Q. Seelye & Neil A. Lewis, Newsweek Says It Is Retracting Koran 
Report, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/05/17/politics/17koran.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. 
 9. Human Rights Watch Statement on the Death of Andrei Shelkavenko, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH, May 31, 2004, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/05/31/human-rights-watch-
statement-death-andrei-shelkavenko. 
V
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other beliefs currently shared by the international community might  
actually be based on erroneous reports. The fact that in some instances 
the falsity of such reports was eventually revealed does not guarantee a 
similar result in other instances. It certainly does not ensure that inaccu-
racies are corrected early enough to prevent severe detriment. 
Nevertheless, no effective relief is currently available to defamed 
states. Presumably, most states share the notion that reputation is merely 
an interest and not a right, hence the weak efforts to subject their reputa-
tions to international legal protection. A similar attitude prevails in the 
academic literature. As will be demonstrated, scholars have mostly  
focused on connections between reputation and both economic and  
political power, as well as the manners in which reputational concerns 
incentivize compliance with international law and treaty obligations.10 
Meanwhile, barely any attention has been dedicated to states’ legal abili-
ties to protect their reputations against wrongful harm. This Article fills 
that void by attempting to conceptualize state reputation as a legal right 
and to determine what remedies states may use to enforce such a right. 
Bearing in mind that general principles of law recognized by national 
legal systems form a source of inspiration for international law,11 the ob-
servation that almost every state in the world has a civil or criminal law 
protecting individual and institutional reputation against defamation12 is 
highly significant. Generally speaking, the core issue redressed by  
domestic defamation law is false allegations injurious to reputation.13 
Although offensive expressions of opinion—which can neither be proved 
nor rebutted—are punishable in some jurisdictions under certain cir-
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra Parts III, IV.   
 11. Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. 
 12. MARK W. JANIS, RICHARD S. KAY & ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 268 (3d ed. 2008); Bonnie Docherty, Defamation 
Law: Positive Jurisprudence, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 263, 266 (2000); U.S. Agency for 
International Development Office of Democracy and Governance, The Enabling Envi-
ronment for Free and Independent Media: Contribution to Transparent and Accountable 
Governance, OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES, Jan. 2002, at 38, available at 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacm00
6.pdf [hereinafter Enabling Environment].  
 13. C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State 
of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 237 
(1993); Shawn A. Bone, Private Harms in the Cyber-World: The Conundrum of Choice 
of Law for Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
279, 325 n.250 (2005); Elena Yanchukova, Criminal Defamation and Insult Laws: An 
Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-Communist Jurisdic-
tions, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 863 (2003). 
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cumstances, the central meaning of defamation around the world, under 
which most cases fall in practice, seems to concern derogatory state-
ments of fact.14 The internationally agreed-upon notion that a collective 
of actors should employ a set of norms protecting the reputations of its 
individual members may be applied to states if sufficient similarities be-
tween the domestic and the international realms can be traced. 
Drawing insights from the disciplines of political science, international 
relations, sociology, and communications studies, this Article will argue 
that the principal rationales of defamation law, which typically concerns 
natural persons and private legal entities, are indeed relevant to states as 
well. Given the prominence of mass media reporting and public opinion 
in today’s international arena, false defamatory statements harm substan-
tial interests of states, especially politically and economically weaker 
states. This is particularly true when states are accused of violating the 
laws of war or international human rights, to which immense moral sig-
nificance is attributed. The harm states suffer also generates side-effects 
that are often felt by individual citizens domestically. Furthermore, 
viewed from the perspective of the international community, defamatory 
falsehoods reduce states’ incentives to comply with international law, 
and render global decision-making less informed and, consequently, less 
                                                                                                             
 14. Under the dictates of the American Constitution, as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court, a statement of opinion is not actionable unless “it implies the alle-
gation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). In other common law jurisdictions, the defense of “Fair 
Comment” (sometimes called “Honest Opinion”) precludes recovery for expressions of 
such kind relating to matters of public interest. See William Akel & Tracey J. Walker, 
New Zealand, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 271, 280 (Christian Campbell ed., 
1997); Peter L. Bartlett, Australia, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 3, 21–22; Roger 
D. McConchie, Canada, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 57, 74–76; Alan Williams, 
England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY 107, 114. In addition, the defa-
mation laws of most Continental countries provide for a defense for expressions of opi-
nion, though such defense is usually qualified. See INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND PRIVACY 
HANDBOOK: A GLOBAL REFERENCE FOR JOURNALISTS, PUBLISHERS, WEBMASTERS, AND 
LAWYERS 378–79 (Charles J. Glasser, Jr. ed., 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LIBEL 
AND PRIVACY HANDBOOK]; EMMANUEL E. PARASCHOS, MEDIA LAW AND REGULATION IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION: NATIONAL, TRANSNATIONAL AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES 60 (1998). 
The European Court of Human Rights similarly grants what it labels “value-judgments” 
heightened protection. See Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 
(1986). The opinion defense is also recognized by the laws of major Asian states, namely, 
Hong Kong, India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Singapore. INTERNATIONAL LIBEL 
AND PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra, at 378–79. For further support for the contention that 
defamation law focuses on factual statements, see generally Dienes & Levine, supra note 
13, at 237; Bone, supra note 13, at 325 n.250. 
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efficient. Arguably, defamatory falsehoods also undermine individuals’ 
rights to be properly informed and to take a meaningful part in global 
governance. 
Hence, this Article will call for an acknowledgment of state reputa-
tional rights within international law through a novel normative frame-
work parallel to established domestic defamation laws. The right to  
reputation would only protect states against inaccurate statements of fact 
depicting concrete events, as distinguished from unpleasing professional 
or ideological views about complex political situations, or critical state-
ments of opinion. The proposed regime—the precise, detailed characteri-
zation of which exceeds the scope of this Article—would aim to  
vindicate unjustly defamed reputations without imposing any sanction 
whatsoever on publishers. Alternatively, this Article will propose the 
establishment of a mechanism for the effective dissemination of states’ 
replies to defamatory accusations. 
Following a review and an analysis of the current domestic and inter-
national legal landscape in Part I, this Article will apply the logic of do-
mestic defamation law to the international realm. Part II of this Article 
will examine the perspective of the defamed state and its nationals,  
describing the political, economic, and personal harms that defamatory 
publications targeting states produce. Part III will demonstrate the ways 
in which false allegations regarding states can interfere with international 
efforts to establish organized, efficient, and rational global governance. 
Part IV will explain why defamation against states is an existing pheno-
menon and why such defamatory communications are internalized by 
their recipients (both presuppositions up to this point), thereby spotlight-
ing the practical importance of protecting the reputations of states. Thus, 
Part IV will argue that contemporary trends in global politics and media 
jeopardize states’ abilities to maintain accurate reputations in that they 
foster the wide circulation of false defamatory allegations, render such 
statements highly influential, and stymie correction of such statements. 
Finally, Part V will briefly touch upon the question—which merits sep-
arate research—of how to solve the posed problem. Part V will discuss 
several parameters for plausible courses of action, which take into  
account the various interests at stake, including those of publishers of 
defamatory content as well as the collective interest in preserving free-
dom of speech. 
I. CURRENT PROTECTION OF STATE REPUTATION UNDER DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
The following review of the contemporary legal situation aims to illu-
strate two points: (1) that there is a lacuna concerning the protection of 
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state reputation; and (2) that this state of affairs is not grounded in any 
sweeping jurisprudential rationale or general policy consideration that 
deny altogether the theoretical justification for such protection. 
A. The Domestic Level 
Democracies seem to share the position that expressions portraying a 
state, government, or subdivision thereof in a negative light normally do 
not give rise to liability.15 This is so in both the civil and the criminal 
contexts, which will be discussed separately. 
In many democratic legal systems, governmental entities may not file 
civil suits for defamation that targets them.16 Such an approach has been 
endorsed, for instance, by courts in the United States,17 the United King-
dom,18 Australia,19 India, and South Africa.20 Thus, when a governmental 
body is criticized as such in an impersonal manner—without explicit or 
implicit reference to any of its individual members—no cause of action 
arises.21 While legal authorities following this approach typically handle 
cases in which governmental bodies file claims in their own jurisdictions, 
there is no reason to assume courts would treat differently suits brought 
                                                                                                             
 15. See sources cite infra note 21. 
 16. See Docherty, supra note 12, at 267. 
 17. E.g., City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86 (Ill. 1923); State v. Time, Inc., 
249 So. 2d 328, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1971), writ denied, 252 So. 2d 456 (La. 1971); John-
son City v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tenn. 1972); see also 1 
ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 
2.10.1 n.554 (3d ed. 2003); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4:76 (2d ed. 
2009). 
 18. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 534 
(HL) (U.K.). 
 19. Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 680 (Austl.). 
 20. Docherty, supra note 12, at 268–69. 
 21. IAN LOVELAND, POLITICAL LIBELS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 121–22 (2000); David 
A. Elder, Small Town Police Forces, Other Governmental Entities and the Misapplica-
tion of the First Amendment to the Small Group Defamation Theory—A Plea for Funda-
mental Fairness for Mayberry, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 881, 912–13 (2004); Joseph H. 
King, Jr., Reference to the Plaintiff Requirement in Defamatory Statements Directed at 
Groups, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 343, 352 (2000). Note that the New South Wales 
Court—and perhaps also the English House of Lords, according to the New South Wales 
court’s interpretation of the Derbyshire decision—left open the possibility of suing for 
malicious or injurious falsehood. Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994) 33 
N.S.W.L.R. at 691. Yet this cause of action is probably not very useful in the context of 
attacks on governmental bodies, because it requires both proof of malice and quantifiable 
economic loss. John Fleming, Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defama-
tion, 12 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 15, 18 (1978). 
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by foreign states. Not only would such an approach constitute discrimi-
nation against the domestic government, but entertainment of these 
claims is also expected to raise serious problems, as will be explained 
below.22 
Two main arguments underlie the aforementioned policy, neither of 
which compels the conclusion that states’ reputations in the international 
community are not to be protected. 
The first rationale is the proposition that governmental entities do not 
meet the definition of a “person,” to whom the defamation cause of ac-
tion generally relates.23 Thus, a Louisiana court of appeal held in State v. 
Time, Inc. that the state, which is a creature of the people and does not 
exist separately from the people, is incapable of being defamed by the 
people.24 The Court of Appeal of New South Wales based its view on 
quite a similar argument.25 The English House of Lords elaborated this 
notion by observing that in the case of an elected body temporarily under 
the control of one political party or another, it is difficult to say that such 
a body has any reputation of its own. According to this view, 
“[R]eputation in the eyes of the public is more likely to attach itself to 
the controlling political party,” or to the executives who carry on such 
body’s day-to-day management.26 
Yet, this line of reasoning appears to be confined to domestic relations 
between government and citizenry. The rationale that governmental bo-
dies do not have any independent image in the minds of the people they 
represent does not seem to apply in the international realm, where vari-
ous actors interact in a more-or-less horizontal manner and none is 
elected directly by the others. A simple example demonstrates this point. 
While it may be true that the German Ministry of Health has no reputa-
tion among the German people distinct from that of the Ministry’s senior 
                                                                                                             
 22. See infra Part VI. It should be noted that high-ranking officials who have been 
individually defamed are not barred a priori from suing for defamation abroad. As the 
officials’ actions are often equated with those of their states, such claims could also serve 
the reputational interests of the states. For a famous example see Sharon v. Time, Inc., 
599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). However, personal reference may not always be in-
ferred from a defamatory report pertaining to a state. Moreover, the problems inherent in 
handling matters of that kind in domestic courts, explained infra in Part II(A), also affect 
personal suits. 
 23. SMOLLA, supra note 17, § 4:76. 
 24. State v. Time, Inc., 249 So. 2d 328, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1971), writ denied, 252 So. 
2d 456 (La. 1971). 
 25. Ballina Shire Council v. Ringland (1994) 33 N.S.W.L.R. 680 (Austl.). 
 26. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 550 
(HL) (U.K.). 
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officials or governing political party, the Federal Republic of Germany 
certainly has a reputation in the eyes of other states’ leaders, foreign pub-
lics, and nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, as we shall later 
see, the contention that states have reputations abroad is firmly supported 
by vast international relations literature.27 
The second policy consideration that leads courts to deny govern-
ments’ standing in civil defamation suits is the importance of allowing 
criticism of governments.28 Under U.S. law, this approach is grounded in 
the First Amendment of the Constitution, the primary purpose of which 
is to ensure the freedom to criticize the government without the threat of 
retaliation of any kind.29 Similarly, the House of Lords has held that un-
der English common law principles “[i]t is of the highest public impor-
tance that . . . any governmental body . . . should be open to uninhibited 
public criticism.”30 Once again, however, what these courts have in mind 
is the domestic defamation action familiar to them, in which the publisher 
of the allegedly defamatory material finds himself or herself the defen-
dant in a judicial proceeding and faces sanctions if found liable. In con-
trast, if substantially different paths are adopted for vindicating states’ 
reputations—paths that do not involve adversary litigation—such diffi-
culty might be resolved. The final Part of this Article will propose such a 
solution. 
The state of the law is somewhat different in the criminal context. The 
legislation of many states renders certain expressions against the gov-
ernment, usually falling under the general category of “sedition,” crimi-
nally punishable.31 Sedition laws often cover value judgments and true 
statements, in addition to false allegations.32 Such laws are particularly 
common in regions that are relatively unstable or where democratic prin-
ciples are not deeply rooted, such as Asia,33 Africa,34 and Eastern  
                                                                                                             
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. Docherty, supra note 12, at 267. 
 29. E.g., City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 90 (Ill. 1927); Johnson City v. 
Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tenn. 1972); see also SMOLLA, supra 
note 17, § 4:76. 
 30. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534, 547 
(HL) (U.K.). 
 31. See infra notes 32–41 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Enabling Environment, supra note 12, at 34. 
 33. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT NO 104, FIGHTING WORDS: A 
REVIEW OF SEDITION LAWS IN AUSTRALIA 134, (2006), available at http://www.austlii. 
edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/104/ALRC104.pdf [hereinafter ALRC REPORT]. 
 34. Id. at 138; H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Chal-
lenge of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1297 (2006). 
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Europe,35 and they are most prevalent in authoritarian regimes.36 Western 
countries, however, have restricted the applicability of these laws over 
the years to communications that endanger national security or the public 
order; they are normally only resorted to in rare, extreme circum-
stances.37 When European states, in particular, attempt to utilize such 
statutes, they are often restrained by the European Court of Human 
Rights.38 
Two issues are particularly important for the purposes of this Article. 
First, it may be inferred from the above discussion that mere defamation 
of a state, devoid of salient security implications, seldom gives rise to 
indictment in democratic states. Second, sedition laws seem to prohibit 
only insults directed at domestic authorities. Comprehensive comparative 
surveys of the areas of defamation, sedition, and political speech do not 
mention any statute criminalizing defamation against foreign states (as 
opposed to contempt of their flags or symbols) or indictment brought for 
such expressions.39 Thus, the current level of protection for states’ repu-
tations is even further reduced. Assuming40 that states’ interests in repu-
tation reside primarily in the realm of international relations, a ruling of a 
                                                                                                             
 35. See Yanchukova, supra note 13, at 870. 
 36. See id. at 883–90. 
 37. See ALRC REPORT, supra note 33, at 120, 133–38; PARASCHOS, supra note 14, at 
97–101; Yanchukova, supra note 13, at 871, 873. As these sources indicate, the scope of 
sedition laws has been restricted through statutory amendments, judicial interpretation, or 
prosecutorial policy. 
 38. E.g., Castells v. Spain, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 445, 464 (1992) (finding that the Spanish 
government’s attempted use of a defamation action against a politician representing Bas-
que separatists violated the politician’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms); Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 13778/88, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 843 (1992) (find-
ing similarly that the Icelandic government’s prosecution of a journalist for writing about 
alleged police brutality violated the journalist’s Article 10 rights). 
 39. See ALRC REPORT, supra note 33; DAVID I. FISHER, DEFAMATION VIA SATELLITE: 
A EUROPEAN LAW PERSPECTIVE 157–80 (1998); INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND PRIVACY 
HANDBOOK, supra note 14; INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY, supra note 14; LOVELAND, 
supra note 21; PARASCHOS, supra note 14; PETER N. AMPONSAH, LIBEL LAW, POLITICAL 
CRITICISM, AND DEFAMATION OF PUBLIC FIGURES: THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND 
AUSTRALIA (2004); Richard N. Winfield & Kristin Mendoza, The Abolition Movement: 
Decriminalizing Defamation and Insult Laws, 25 COMM. LAW. 7 (2007); Docherty, supra 
note 12; Yanchukova, supra note 13. It should be noted that under certain circumstances, 
some States prohibit insults against foreign state officials, but not against the foreign 
states themselves. See, e.g., Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code],Nov. 13, 1998, Bun-
desgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I] 3322, as amended Dec. 19, 2001, § 103; PARASCHOS, 
supra note 14, at 67–69 (discussing Italian law). 
 40. See infra Part III. 
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domestic court in favor of its own government—which is not expected to 
gain much prominence and trust abroad—is arguably quite unhelpful. 
Nevertheless, the absence (or scarcity) of legislation prohibiting defa-
mation against foreign states, as well as the limited feasibility of punish-
ing expressions against domestic democratic governments, do not in and 
of themselves negate the justification for protecting state reputation un-
der international law. First, one might guess that the main reason states 
permit defamation that targets other states is simply the lack of sufficient 
practical interest to proscribe such defamation, at least on a unilateral 
basis. Second, the freedom of speech concerns that led to the restriction 
of sedition laws are arguably far less significant when the speech one 
seeks to regulate is false statements of fact, as opposed to true statements 
of fact or value judgments. The European Court of Human Rights, for 
instance, has refrained from holding that false allegations targeting a 
government may not be penalized; on the contrary, it can be inferred 
from the Court’s decisions that they may.41 
Thus, when examining the practical concerns that drive countries to 
leave state reputation essentially unprotected under domestic laws, it is 
apparent that these concerns, on the one hand, do not touch upon the 
theoretical dimension of the problem, and, on the other hand, are hardly 
applicable in the international realm. 
B. The International Level 
There has been only one genuine attempt during the last several dec-
ades to protect states from defamation internationally. This attempt was 
made within the Convention on the International Right of Correction 
(“CIRC”),42 which entered into force in 1962. The contracting states in-
tended for the CIRC to, inter alia, “implement the right of their peoples 
to be fully and reliably informed[,] . . . to improve understanding be-
tween their peoples through the free flow of information and opinion,” 
and to redress the danger to the “maintenance of friendly relations be-
tween peoples . . . arising from the publication of inaccurate reports.”43 
Under the CIRC, when a contracting state contends that a news report 
published about it abroad is false or distorted, and capable of injuring its 
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relations with other states or its national dignity, the state may submit its 
version of the facts to the contracting states where the report has been 
disseminated.44 The receiving states are obliged to forward the reply to 
the relevant media outlets.45 If any of the receiving states fails to do so, 
the defamed state may then submit the reply to the United Nations Secre-
tary-General, who is prompted by the CIRC to give the reply appropriate 
publicity through the information channels at his disposal.46 
The CIRC’s impact is rendered insignificant by the fact that it was only 
joined by a small number of states,47 none of which, except France, may 
be regarded as a strong player in the international community. Further-
more, parties to the CIRC have rarely made use of it.48 This probably 
stems from the CIRC’s ineffectiveness at protecting state reputations, 
since it does not require the media to publish states’ replies.49 
The question is why states have refrained from devising greater protec-
tion for their reputations than that provided by the CIRC. One possible 
answer may be found in the Preamble of the CIRC itself. According to 
the Preamble, the imposition of international penalties for the publication 
of false reports is not practicable. Since the international libel law regime 
proposed by this Article does not mandate the imposition of sanctions, 
the Preamble’s practicality concern does not preclude it. Under another 
explanation, it is the weak states whose reputations are most jeopardized 
and who find it the most difficult to communicate their views to foreign 
audiences.50 This very weakness also prevents them from redressing their 
problem effectively in the international legal field. Alternatively, perhaps 
what is missing is merely a conceptual or a definitional shift, which 
would elevate the interest in reputation—undoubtedly recognized by 
each and every state—into a right.51 
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II. THE STATE’S PERSPECTIVE: DEFAMATION AND THE NEED TO 
REDRESS ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The following section will attempt to show, from the perspective of the 
defamed state and its nationals, how the basic principles and objectives 
underlying domestic defamation laws support the claim that states should 
be protected by a similar set of norms. 
A. Drawing an Analogy from Domestic Defamation Laws 
Domestic defamation laws seek to preserve a given reputation or image 
enjoyed by the individual in the eyes of others or society at large.52 Such 
laws are based on the premise that false derogatory statements of fact 
relating to a person have the capability of altering third parties’ attitudes 
toward the person, thereby causing him or her unjust injuries.53 Those 
injuries may manifest in various forms, such as a reduction in the  
subject’s social status, interferences with his or her relationships and pro-
fessional progress, pecuniary harm stemming from loss of employment 
income or business revenue, and emotional distress.54 
Significantly, not only natural persons but also juridical persons are 
recognized as capable of suffering damages from defamatory publica-
tions and are granted the right to sue for them. Although some jurisdic-
tions limit recovery to certain kinds of entities, or for provable economic 
loss only, there is a large international consensus that business corpora-
tions may sue for defamation, or at least have a parallel cause of action 
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for trade libel or commercial disparagement.55 This approach reflects the 
common belief that large organizations may have reputations in the 
minds of third parties distinct from those of the people comprising 
them.56 Organizations build such reputations through hard work, talent, 
and, possibly, virtuous conduct.57 Financial revenues serve as the main 
indicator of their reputations.58 Defamatory utterances, including those 
pertaining to the quality of products or services, are capable of harming 
the organization’s reputation, thereby depriving it, at least partially, of 
the fruits of its labor.59 
The notion that an artificial being with no intrinsic honor or feelings 
can bring suit in defamation may be applied to another entity that is  
legally and factually separable from the human collective comprising it, 
and that undoubtedly has a reputation in the minds of others—the state. 
Much like corporations, states have financial interests of their own. If 
and when these interests are jeopardized by defamation, granting states 
relief may be justified, similarly to the case of corporations. Furthermore, 
as opposed to nearly all corporations, whose ultimate objective is profit 
maximization, states have many nonfinancial interests in the internation-
al sphere. The question is whether, how, and to what extent states’ leg-
itimate interests are affected by defamatory publications targeting them. 
If such harms can be demonstrated, then the state—as the principal sub-
ject of rights and duties in international law—is arguably entitled to  
protection against them.60 
It is worth noting that, according to some scholars, the reputations of 
states are not uniform but, rather, context-specific. Under this approach, 
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each state has a relatively independent reputation in the areas of trade, 
environment, human rights, and so forth, in addition to reputations in 
matters that are unrelated to legal compliance, such as financial and po-
litical stability, and military strength.61 For the purpose of the following 
discussion, however, it is not necessary to decide whether such a view 
has merit,62 nor is it crucial to make a priori distinctions between differ-
ent kinds of state reputations. In order to satisfy the main goal of this  
Article and establish states’ conceptual entitlement to a right of reputa-
tion, it is sufficient to prove in general that defamation targeting states 
exposes them to tangible harms. As the examples presented below will 
demonstrate, such harms do occur at least with regard to the specific 
areas mentioned by a given defamatory publication, and, in some cases, 
other areas as well. For the sake of comparison, the legal concept of  
reputation in private law comprises an individual’s interest in being res-
pected by society in regard to various aspects of his or her personality—
morality, honesty, compliance with law (in any legal field), professional 
competence, and so forth—unitarily.63 Moreover, as we have seen, very 
different types of harm related to such different interests jointly justify 
protecting individuals against defamation in positive law. A similar  
approach may therefore be taken in the context of state reputation. 
B. The Value of State Reputation 
Perceptions of a state’s characteristics, behavior, or condition obvious-
ly impact the choices of foreign state officials and non-state actors in 
their dealings with that state.64 Thus, for example, by developing and 
preserving a good reputation for compliance with obligations, states are 
able to extract greater concessions in exchange for their promises.65 Fur-
thermore, the level of foreign investment in any given state is immensely 
                                                                                                             
 61. George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and Interna-
tional Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S101–03 (2002). 
 62. Contra Picker, supra note 1, at 107. 
 63. See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, Section 43(a), Commercial Falsehood, and the 
First Amendment: A Proposed Framework, 78 MINN. L. REV. 309, 338–39 (1993); Post, 
supra note 59, at 693–719. 
 64. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 107 
(2004); Juyan Zhang & William L. Benoit, Message Strategies of Saudi Arabia’s Image 
Restoration Campaign after 9/11, 30 PUB. REL. REV. 161, 161 (2004). 
 65. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1823, 1886 (2002). 
122 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
affected by evaluations of the state’s financial situation.66 Communica-
tions scholar Jian Wang summarizes this notion by observing that 
a nation’s reputational capital may affect the country’s ability to build 
coalitions and alliances to achieve international political objectives, to 
influence perceptions and purchase decisions regarding products from 
certain countries of origin, to attract foreign investment or in-bound 
tourism.67 
In addition, government officials’ beliefs concerning another state’s 
conduct could lead the first state to respond in a way that harms the lat-
ter’s interests. For instance, information indicating that a state has 
breached its bilateral or multilateral obligations, such as by engaging in 
acts of aggression, might induce other states to resort to trade or diplo-
matic sanctions, or to take military actions against it.68 
The issue of state reputation is particularly acute in the modern day. 
Since the global phenomenon of democratization has increased govern-
ments’ attention to their citizens’ views regarding foreign policies,69 
mass media and public opinion have come to play major roles in interna-
tional politics.70 In a two-step process, mass media communications on 
international matters shape public opinion of states and events,71 which 
in turn, affects directly or indirectly the foreign policies of states and the 
actions of the international community vis-à-vis the states concerned.72 
Naturally, this effect is mostly prominent in democracies. But even non-
democratic regimes are influenced to a certain extent by domestic public 
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opinion,73 though such public opinion is much more susceptible to man-
ipulation by the governments themselves than in democracies. 
Public opinion of foreign states—and the events and situations involv-
ing them—may affect foreign policy in diverse ways. First, and most 
directly, foreign policy platforms introduced by candidates and parties in 
national elections can play a factor in voters’ decisions, which are  
thereafter expressed in the actual policies implemented by the elected 
government. Second, the public can exert pressure on the government to 
act in a particular fashion with regard to a discrete situation.74 Real-time 
media reporting of dramatic news events, especially through televised 
images, tends to arouse an emotional response on the part of the public, 
who then demands that quick and often simplistic measures be taken to 
deal with the crisis.75 Commentators use the phrase “CNN effect” to de-
scribe “television coverage, primarily of horrific humanitarian disasters, 
that forces policy makers to take actions they otherwise would not have 
taken, such as military intervention.”76 Third, a subtler but arguably more 
consistent and profound impact of public opinion on foreign policy is 
embedded in the general images and reputations it attributes to states. 
The level of popularity enjoyed by a state in public opinion abroad influ-
ences its ability to achieve concessions from foreign governments and to 
reach other desired policy outcomes.77 International law, among other 
factors, plays an important role in this context. Alleged violations of its 
norms—particularly those pertaining to human rights—tend to have a 
strong impact on public opinion, which in turn shapes foreign policies 
and private actors’ economic choices.78 
Thus, according to Wang: 
National reputation is unquestionably an instrument of power . . . . 
[F]oreign public opinion is gaining ever more significance in forming 
an emerging globalized public and influencing international political 
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process and outcome . . . . [T]he role of individuals and their expressed 
opinions do form a climate of opinion, in which decision-makers pur-
sue policies. When public opinion is activated, the climate of opinion 
can limit or broaden policy choices and actions. Therefore, the percep-
tions and opinions held by foreign publics regarding a given nation  
become critically important to decisions by nation-states.79 
And, as Professor Evan Potter further explains: 
Image counts for a lot in contemporary world politics. Whether a coun-
try needs to build international coalitions against terrorism, co-operate 
to protect the environment, attract foreign investment, or bring in for-
eign students, influencing foreign public opinion is critical to national 
success because, in the absence of substantial military or economic 
weight, most countries are the image or ‘words’ they project abroad. 
Their room to maneuver is affected by their image, or soft power, so 
that all points of contact—whether promoting policies or exporting—
will feed off this general image in both positive and negative ways.80 
Notably, a state’s reputation often has concrete implications for its 
population. For instance, national economic recession—which, in the 
context of this Article, could result from the shattering of a state’s inter-
national status, a reduction of its credit rating, or sanctions or boycotts 
imposed on it in response to its perceived behavior—tends to percolate 
down to the level of the ordinary citizen. In addition, the scope of tour-
ism and foreign investment directly affects domestic businesses.81 Final-
ly, since the state represents the collective interests of its citizens in the 
international arena,82 its negotiating power and ability to extract conces-
sions could dictate prevailing conditions in a myriad of areas that are 
relevant to the citizens’ lives and welfare, such as security, international 
trade, health, and the environment. 
The high value of reputation is best evidenced by the growing under-
standing among states of the utility of actively enhancing and using rep-
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utation as a tool of foreign policy.83 Since “communication, education, 
and persuasion have become major techniques in foreign relations,”84 
successful “image politics” translates to power in the international are-
na.85 In addition, extensive academic literature is dedicated to the issue of 
states’ image strategies, mainly within the context of two related and fre-
quently discussed concepts. The first is soft power: a state’s ability to 
achieve its objectives by highlighting the attractiveness of its culture, 
political ideals, and policies.86 The second is public diplomacy: the  
endeavor to shape foreign public opinion, thereby inducing foreign gov-
ernments to make policy decisions compatibly with the political objec-
tives of the state taking these measures.87 Scholars have gone so far as to 
say that “today half of ‘power politics’ consists of image-making. With 
the rising importance of publics in foreign affairs, image-making has 
steadily increased.”88 Likewise, it has been contended that 
[f]avorable image and reputation around the world, achieved through 
attraction and persuasion, have become more important than territory, 
access, and raw materials, traditionally acquired through military and 
economic measures.89 
C. The Harms of Defamation 
Having examined the importance of state reputation, we must recall 
that information about states inevitably contains inaccuracies in some 
cases, and distorts others’ perceptions of those states.90 Such erroneous 
perceptions are occasionally favorable to the state concerned, but on oth-
er occasions they might portray the state in a negative light. Although a 
state’s overall image is the product of a complex plethora of components, 
it must be presumed—as domestic defamation laws do—that the availa-
ble factual information pertaining to an actor is a crucial factor in the 
formation of others’ opinions of the actor. It is therefore clear that all the 
reputation-related benefits states enjoy in the international arena are jeo-
pardized when false derogatory statements of fact are published about 
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them. The damage may be irreversible, even if the truth is finally  
revealed after months or years, as history is “a succession of short-run 
situations that may alter the course of events for good.”91 While a state’s 
significant political, economic, or military power may counterbalance 
certain reputational harms, the weaker the state, the more acute the con-
sequences of defamation. International legal protection against the harms 
of defamation is thus critical. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S PERSPECTIVE: THE 
COLLECTIVE INTEREST IN PROTECTING STATES FROM FALSE 
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS 
The justifications for establishing an international parallel to domestic 
defamation laws transcend particular states’ interests in maintaining their 
reputations. The following section will contend—by analogy to the view 
that private defamation law serves the society at large—that protecting 
state reputation can enhance organized and efficient global governance 
for the benefit of the entire international community. 
A. Preserving Incentives for Compliance with International Law 
Private reputation, so it is contended, is an efficient social mechanism 
that promotes cooperation within a community while relying on the self-
interest of the individual.92 Given the social benefits that are bestowed 
upon those who are known to conform to public values, and are other-
wise denied, reputation provides an incentive to conform to these  
values.93 While the dissemination of true information creates transparen-
cy and serves the stated objective, false information undermines it. When 
it is hard to discern whether negative reports regarding individuals are 
true or false, the level of censure an alleged wrongdoer is subjected to 
decreases, and the cost associated with wrongdoing consequently lessens. 
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On the other hand, the perceived social advantages of compliance are 
moderate or uncertain where compliance does not immunize one from 
being accused of noncompliance. Assuming that abiding by any norm 
involves certain personal costs, the incentives to respect the community’s 
norms thus recede.94 The law of defamation is designed to prevent such 
outcomes. 
A similar analysis can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the internation-
al arena. Arguably, repetitive publication of false reports accusing States 
of violating international norms might diminish the overall tendency of 
compliance. This proposition is sustainable under the two principal social 
science paradigms commonly used to interpret state behavior: rational 
choice theory and social constructivism. 
According to the rational choice model, States act as “rational deci-
sion-makers [by selecting] the course of action . . . that maximizes their 
utility, as determined by their goals and the alternative options available 
to them.”95 Among the complex plethora of factors affecting the choice 
between compliance and defection with regard to a certain norm or re-
gime, a prominent role is attributed to states’ interests in maintaining 
good reputations within the international community.96 As international 
relations theorists and international lawyers have long argued, States 
honor their commitments primarily because they fear that any evidence 
of unreliability will reduce the willingness of other actors to interact with 
them.97 Having a good reputation for compliance allows States to enter 
into more profitable cooperative arrangements,98 and, as explained 
above, assists them in achieving various policy goals in the international 
political and financial arenas. Thus, whether a state will comply with 
international law in any given case depends on the balance of the reputa-
tional benefits of compliance and the costs of compliance. 
False defamatory publications accusing compliant States of noncom-
pliance undercut the benefits they seek to enjoy by complying. Since this 
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phenomenon renders the perceived political advantages of compliance ex 
ante moderated or uncertain, States—especially those that feel routinely 
injured—have reduced incentives to maintain international agreements 
and abide by international law.99 While the extent of the decrease is ob-
viously speculative and unquantifiable (and constitutes only one of many 
factors influencing State behavior), it might become acute in borderline 
cases in which the costs and benefits of compliance appear to be equal. It 
is asserted, for instance, that when matters of national security are at 
stake, the scales are not easily tipped in favor of compliance with the 
pertinent international norms,100 such as those demanding respect of hu-
man rights during the fight against terrorism. Even when states choose to 
comply despite opposing interests, there is necessarily a delicate balance 
of cost and benefit. Any minor interference with the equation, in the form 
of a decrease in the reputation-related advantages, might therefore  
increase the overall rate of noncompliance in these crucial matters. 
Social constructivism may lead to similar conclusions. According to 
this model, compliance with international law is not the outcome of cost-
benefit calculations, but rather of a process of international socialization, 
driven in a large extent by states’ non-instrumental desires to obtain posi-
tive evaluations by their peer members in the international community.101 
Much like individuals’ tendencies, most states’ reluctance to provoke 
negative social judgments inhibits their inclination to violate norms.102 
The preservation of an appropriate incentive to comply thus requires high 
compatibility between the reputation a state deserves and its actual repu-
tation. 
Sociology may provide us with additional, related insights in this con-
text. For instance, it is contended that a feeling of detachment from  
society causes an individual to self-alienate from society and its norms, 
which in turn reduces his or her willingness to comply with those 
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norms.103 Moreover, the lower the social status that the individual risks 
losing as a consequence of deviance, the higher the likelihood of rule-
breaking.104 The same could be applied, perhaps, to states that are  
positioned at the periphery of the international community.105 Arguably, 
ostracism and isolation of states caused by persistent dissemination of 
negative information about them might undermine their tendency to 
comply with international law. It is, of course, particularly important to 
prevent false information from generating such an outcome. 
B. Promoting Informed Global Governance 
An important function that defamation law may serve in democratic 
societies is fostering informed self-governance, especially where false 
publications regarding public figures and public matters are concerned.106 
This notion may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the international arena. 
It is commonly held, particularly within American First Amendment 
jurisprudence, that collective decision-making is best served by the con-
stant exchange of views and information, which enables society to make 
informed choices between competing courses of action.107 The inform-
ation whose free flow is most crucial is the information concerning the 
actions of the government and its people.108 However, information must 
not only be available but also be accurate in order to sustain valuable and 
beneficial public debate. The political value judgments of individuals and 
society, which are the driving forces of self-governance, are based large-
ly on raw data.109 Since a decision-maker’s “image of reality” and the 
information he or she possesses have significant influence on the deci-
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sion he or she will make,110 the nature of the information in the public 
domain necessarily projects upon the quality of collective decision-
making. Thus, “democratic governance requires accurate information 
and knowledge of public affairs, not mere opinion, and certainly not an 
aggregation of uninformed preferences.”111 
Clearly, if the public and its representatives deliberate while relying on 
false information, the decisions reached are likely to be less wise.112 Dis-
semination of false defamatory statements pertaining to public officials 
and public figures is capable of producing precisely that situation. Even 
the U.S. Supreme Court, despite its restrictive approach to defamation 
law, has conceded in this context that “there is no constitutional value in 
false statements of fact.”113 Most resolved in this view was Justice Byron 
White, who declared that “First Amendment values are not at all served 
by circulating false statements of fact about public officials. On the con-
trary, erroneous information frustrates these values.”114 
Similar to national political processes, international actions are based 
not so much on objective international reality as on subjective percep-
tions of such reality.115 When any of the players in the international 
community have in mind an image of a certain event or situation that 
does not coincide with reality, their response could be ill-suited to 
achieve the intended policy outcomes and may lead to undesirable con-
sequences.116 
This contention is applicable, first, to the traditional—and still rele-
vant—realm of foreign policy decisions by state officials. Erroneous  
perceptions of a state’s behavior could lead other states to respond in 
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manners that injure the interests of the international community as a 
whole. Generally speaking, undermining friendly international relations 
is harmful in itself, particularly with respect to international stability.117 
More concrete examples are the imposition of sanctions on states, which 
hampers economically desirable free trade; the exclusion of states from 
institutional regimes, which weakens those regimes; and the refusal to 
cooperate with states, which results in a loss of the resources and endea-
vors they could contribute. 
The idea that inaccurate perceptions regarding states may lead others to 
take harmful action is also true in the era of globalization, in which states 
no longer enjoy exclusive power in the international arena.118 Unlike  
before, the direction of global politics is determined by complex interac-
tions between a plethora of state and nonstate actors. But what has not 
changed is the fact that any of the actors involved can make policy mis-
takes when provided with inaccurate information, which can thereby  
negatively affect collective community interests. Special attention should 
be dedicated in this respect to the quality of the information available to 
the international public, whose effective participation in global decision-
making processes is attributed great normative importance.119 For such 
participation to be beneficial—i.e., in order for it to ensure a meaningful 
manifestation of individual political rights, as well as to promote the  
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collective interest in wise and just decisions—it must be based on appro-
priate information.120 
IV. FACTORS IMPEDING THE MAINTENANCE OF ACCURATE STATE 
REPUTATIONS 
The preceding analysis of the individual and collective interests in pro-
tecting state reputation is of little practical significance if one contends 
that states do not face substantial risks of being defamed or that they are 
capable of coping with them effectively. The following will attempt to 
demonstrate that both contentions are wrong. 
A. Threats to States’ Reputations 
1. The Public’s Dependence on Information Supply 
Before identifying the information sources that actively threaten states’ 
reputations, one should consider the background against which these 
sources operate. Thus, in order to facilitate comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomenon of state defamation, this section discusses the charac-
teristics of the primary addressee of defamatory communications: the 
international public.121 These characteristics both foster the circulation of 
defamation in the first place and render such defamation influential. 
Most individuals do not tend to dedicate significant resources to form-
ing their opinions on political matters.122 There is a clear disincentive to 
invest individual effort in gathering and evaluating information on public 
affairs.123 The costs in terms of time and money are far greater than the 
gains since each person’s relative influence on the political process is 
negligible, and the impact of the collective decisions on his or her life 
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often seems remote and obscure.124 The further decisions shift away from 
private concerns to issues that lack a direct and unmistakable personal 
link, the less motivated are individuals to command the facts and to 
shape wise preferences.125 This is even truer with regard to the foreign 
and international domains, in which the costs of information gathering 
and assessment are greater126 and the effects of political decisions on 
one’s personal life are usually slighter. Indeed, many studies have shown 
that levels of knowledge about foreign affairs among publics in the de-
veloped world are very low.127 This situation provides a fertile ground for 
endeavors to fashion the will of the people through the supply of biased 
information, and even when inaccuracies are not deliberate, they can eas-
ily mislead the public into making unsubstantiated judgments.128 
   2. Superficial and Biased Media 
Since the average person presumably possesses limited personal know-
ledge of public matters, the media significantly impacts the political  
positions he or she is likely to adopt.129 For nearly all concerns on the 
public agenda, citizens are exposed to a secondhand reality that is struc-
tured by media reports of events and situations, especially with regard to 
news concerning foreign affairs. “The media are the principal means by 
which the vast majority of individuals receive information about [these 
topics,] . . . for which personal experience is unlikely to provide much 
useful information.”130 This situation is intensified by the revolution in 
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communication technologies, manifested mainly in the advent of the in-
ternet and global news networks such as CNN International, BBC World, 
Sky News, and Al-Jazeera, which have enabled “broadcasting . . . almost 
every significant development in world events to almost every place on 
the globe.”131 
In line with the premise of domestic defamation laws—that messages 
influence people’s views—various studies have demonstrated that news 
reports, especially on television, powerfully shape public opinion,132 par-
ticularly with respect to foreign affairs.133 Thus, clear correlations have 
been found between media coverage and popular perceptions of foreign 
nations.134 One study revealed, for example, that in nine different Muslim 
countries, television news viewing has influenced anti-American atti-
tudes more than any other examined variable.135 Hence, mass media is 
said to be the strongest shaper of national images.136 These images, in 
turn, often translate to public pressure on the political branches to adopt 
certain policies vis-à-vis the states concerned.137 It should be noted that 
the “mediation” of public opinion between media reports and foreign 
policies is not always present or necessary; obviously, political decision-
makers rely on mass media information, which shapes their own beliefs 
and orientations with regard to states and situations.138 
In light of the media’s overwhelming impact, it is important to  
examine the overall quality of the information it conveys. 
Despite the noble role attributed to the press in democratic societies—
enabling the citizenry to make informed political, economic, and social 
decisions, and serving as a check on the government—the ultimate ob-
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jective of modern media outlets is financial profit.139 Thus, the press 
strives to maximize its circulation or rating by adapting the news flow to 
assumed audience preferences. This commercial orientation distorts the 
media’s priorities by emphasizing their entertainment function at the  
expense of their commitment to properly informing the public.140 
As a result, news coverage is often characterized by two salient fea-
tures. First, given the inherent pressure for speed in reporting, and the 
lack of patience of most readers and viewers when it comes to long or 
complicated argumentation, the media tend to oversimplify the news.141 
Second, the nature of the mass media is to prefer sensationalized stories 
and negative events, since, compared to the “ordinary,” the “exceptional” 
is more newsworthy, and, presumably, more interesting to the public.142 
“Good news,” i.e., news relating to good performances or to the non-
occurrence of catastrophes, is seldom considered news at all.143 
Similar trends prevail, perhaps to an even greater extent, in foreign af-
fairs reporting.144 As the space or time given to foreign news is restricted 
by financial considerations,145 the press often refrains from covering and 
explaining “sociostructural contexts or complex motives for actions.”146 
In addition, newsworthiness considerations, favoring unusual and dra-
matic events over complex and prolonged situations and processes, often 
deprive the public consciousness of broad context and prevent genuine 
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understanding of events.147 Consequently, simplistic reports of alleged 
state aggression, human rights violations, and other breaches of interna-
tional law are inherently prone to gain prominence. 
Further harm to state reputation results from media bias. Such bias 
might stem from willful editorial decisions, or at least from concrete po-
litical views that shape the judgments of journalists and influence the 
manner in which they present supposedly hard-fact news.148 In addition, 
the foreign news desks of major media outlets often hire local reporters 
and photographers residing in conflict zones, who might provide their 
employers with information that fits the views and interests of their re-
spective nations.149 It is also well known that totalitarian regimes seek to 
control the content of information reported from within their territories 
by censoring stories, threatening journalists and limiting their access to 
places and sources.150 Publication of deficient or inaccurate reports in 
these cases might improperly influence the public’s evaluation of the 
behavior of states that are in conflict with such regimes. 
Perhaps more latent is the systematic prejudice that developing coun-
tries ascribe to the Western press, which dominates the international 
news channels.151 Developing countries complain that the coverage of 
their affairs is generally negative, incomplete, distorted, and ethnocen-
tric.152 According to this perspective, since all news is filtered through 
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Western moral, cultural, and political values, journalists focus on sensa-
tional events that tend to be negative while ignoring processes such as 
economic and health development. Additionally, they emphasize the 
Western angle of stories at the expense of the broader picture, and mi-
scharacterize events by discussing them out of context.153 
Finally, the media obviously make honest mistakes occasionally. Even 
in New York Times v. Sullivan, which restricted the law of defamation 
probably more than any other judicial decision or piece of legislation in 
the world, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that media errors are in-
evitable.154 To make matters worse, many commentators believe that the 
media tends to be very reluctant to publicly admit its errors.155 
3. Unregulated and Unaccountable Nongovernmental Organizations 
Nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) enjoy considerable power 
in global politics with respect to virtually all issues of international con-
cern.156 NGOs pursue their goals mainly through massive involvement in 
the activities of supranational bodies157 and—even more relevant to this 
Article—through direct communication with publics. By disseminating 
information, mostly through the media, NGOs are able to mobilize do-
mestic public opinion in various states to exert pressure on governments 
to implement desired policies.158 As discussed in Part IV.A.1, supra, the 
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fact that citizenries are inadequately informed about international affairs 
makes them highly vulnerable to NGO influences.159 
Human rights NGOs are particularly powerful.160 The international 
community increasingly relies on NGOs to investigate and report human 
rights violations.161 These NGOs now enjoy considerable influence in 
virtually all UN decision-making processes mainly by providing various 
bodies with information relevant to their activities.162 Most importantly, 
NGOs shape global public opinion while exploiting the moral authority 
inherent in human rights rhetoric, which often elicits instinctive sup-
port.163 The prime weapon of human rights NGOs is the “mobilization of 
shame.”164 This technique seeks to induce compliance with human rights 
norms by reporting the behavior of target states, which exposes these 
states to embarrassment, ostracism, and isolation.165 
Despite many NGOs’ important goals and their aspiration to reflect the 
interests and positions of large sectors in international civil society, their 
activities should be looked upon with caution. NGOs are often described 
as self-elected elite that have limited legitimacy, advocate special causes 
and are unrepresentative of the general public.166 Moreover, their fine 
organizational capabilities, stemming from their relatively small size, 
enable them to exercise effective lobbying that is arguably dispropor-
tional to their actual public support.167 Finally, in light of the general ob-
servation that “[a]ctors [in international politics] attempt to mislead and 
manipulate target actors by disseminating incorrect or only partially  
correct facts and interpretations to create desired expectations and con-
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ceptions,” it is even possible that NGOs deliberately deceive on certain 
occasions.168 
Particularly significant, again, are human rights organizations, because 
of their political influence and their central role in circulating communi-
cations critical of states. Thus, the human rights NGO community is said 
to have a problematic record with regard to accuracy in reporting.169  
Several factors might support and explain this assertion. 
First, no prerequisite or certification is required in order to pursue the 
classic activities of human rights organizations, since anyone may simply 
take steps to investigate and publish reports.170 Additionally, no “formal 
checks or balances . . . regulate the quality or reliability of NGO work” 
once it is performed.171 This sometimes has apparent negative conse-
quences. Some studies of the works of human rights organizations have 
demonstrated that their fact-finding missions commonly do not comport 
with reasonable procedural and evidentiary standards.172 For example, 
they often rely upon hearsay statements and documents that are not fully 
authenticated; the witnesses they question are not cross-examined; they 
do not operate for sufficient periods; they do not possess enough person-
nel to guarantee sufficient thoroughness; their reports rarely contain  
dissenting opinions; and the line between their inferences and concrete 
findings of fact is frequently blurred.173 The depth, quality, and reliability 
of their work may also be jeopardized on many occasions by reliance on 
testimony of interested parties.174 Furthermore, international NGOs often 
base their reports on the fact-finding of nationally based NGOs, which 
are likely to be more biased against a party to a conflict, “without mea-
ningful guidelines for obtaining corroborative evidence or . . . [checking 
the] methodologies employed by the national” organization.175 
                                                                                                             
 168. VERTZBERGER, supra note 115, at 27. 
 169. Blitt, supra note 78, at 263. 
 170. Id. at 288. 
 171. Id. at 292. 
 172. See HANS THOOLEN & BERTH VERSTAPPEN, HUMAN RIGHTS MISSIONS: A STUDY 
OF FACT-FINDING PRACTICE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 1, 18 (1986); David 
Weissbrodt, Human Rights Implementation and Fact-finding by International Organiza-
tions, 74 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 17, 18 (1980). 
 173. See Blitt, supra note 78, at 289 and the sources cited therein; INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS 203 (B.G. Ramcharan, ed., 
1982). 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. at 341–42, 360. 
140 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
Second, there is ample evidence of bias and political motivation among 
NGOs.176 Particularly, some NGOs are funded by interested governments 
or private donors that influence their operation,177 while the public at 
large is often completely unaware of such influence.178 
And, third, the fact that many NGOs compete for scarce media cover-
age and limited resources from a few foundations is said to generate  
constant competition between them.179 This competition in turn incenti-
vizes them to devise dramatic new angles and to uncover even greater 
atrocities, sometimes at the expense of accuracy.180 
Many commentators resist such criticism and claim that informal con-
trols to which human rights NGOs are subject—mainly their interests in 
maintaining their own reputations—guarantee the quality of their 
work.181 However, even assuming that most reports issued by human 
rights organizations—at least, by the most prominent and influential 
ones—are true, this does not preclude the risk of mistakes. Thus, the 
need to redress the harms of false reports may not be dismissed.182 
4. Interested Governments and State Officials 
Governments often use propaganda to further various legitimate inter-
ests, but, for some, propaganda constitutes a weapon of distortion and 
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defamation.183 States have often disseminated misinformation in order to 
influence foreign governments’ decision-making so as to advance na-
tional interests.184 States have also used false reports initially publicized 
in the media for their own purposes.185 Finally, there are arguably cases 
in which government officials deliberately deceive their counterparts, 
superiors, or subordinates in order to promote the policies they wish their 
own state to adopt.186 
B. The Insufficiency of Existing Mechanisms to Redress Reputational 
Harms 
As has been demonstrated, suing for defamation in a domestic court is 
not an available option for a state that has been the subject of a false, de-
rogatory report. The following analysis will indicate that such a state 
cannot count on mechanisms outside the scope of defamation law to 
properly protect its interests either. 
1. Relying on Market Competition to Correct Erroneous Reports 
Defamed states may allegedly count on competition in the press market 
to drive media outlets to expose each others’ mistakes. This possibility, 
however, should be given limited weight. 
First, it cannot be assumed that competing media will always be will-
ing to bear the cost of conducting an extensive investigation in order to 
refute a defamatory report. This is true especially since reports refuting 
or contradicting allegations of outrageous conduct are not as sensational 
and dramatic as the accusations themselves.187 As Justice William Bren-
nan of the United States Supreme Court has contended in the context of 
personal defamation: “Denials, retractions, and corrections are not ‘hot’ 
news.”188 
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Second, concentration of ownership in mass media is said to seriously 
diminish the competition in that market.189 Scholars therefore claim that 
the contents and viewpoints communicated by the press are likely to  
become increasingly homogeneous,190 and often use as an example the 
rather uniform position taken by the U.S. media in support of the gov-
ernment before and during the Second Gulf War.191 
Some commentators add that media outlets might even demonstrate 
real reluctance to attack each others’ publications, wishing to show  
professional courtesy or to receive similar treatment themselves.192 The 
situation in the realm of international news intensifies such concerns. 
Many media outlets opt for the relatively cheap method of relying on 
news agencies for their international affairs reports.193 Since four major 
suppliers dominate the news agency market, the prisms through which 
most international news enters the public domain are quite uniform.194 
This is especially true in developing countries, where the media lacks 
resources and, therefore, depends on news agencies and global networks 
for information.195 The increasing reliance of transnational news agencies 
on their national counterparts196 further reduces the likelihood of obtain-
ing diverse viewpoints with regard to particular events. 
For similar reasons, one may not assume that inaccurate reports issued 
by NGOs and circulated through the media are often corrected by the 
media. Nor may competition in the NGO community itself be relied upon 
as a check. By definition, NGOs tend to promote causes that do not  
appeal to states and often even contradict states’ interests. Few NGOs 
dedicate their activities to supporting particular states or enhancing gen-
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eral state interests such as national security, crime control, or public  
order; the ones that do are unlikely to attract much media attention. 
The appearance of the internet has not changed the portrayed reality 
dramatically. No single internet publication can be as effective as a re-
port in the traditional mass media, which still constitute the primary 
source of information in the Western world.197 Though there are news 
websites that enjoy impressive popularity, most are subsidiaries of the 
major newspapers and television networks.198 Furthermore, it should be 
remembered that “in order to retrieve information about a certain topic 
[on the internet], one must actively conduct a targeted search.”199 How-
ever, “[f]ew people have the time or wish to expend the effort to explore 
the gigantic virtual world in any depth . . . .”200 Thus, a person research-
ing on the internet who is not specifically looking for information about a 
certain state will not frequently come across any such information.201 
2. Self-Help: Disseminating the State’s Response 
A course of action supposedly available to defamed states is to try to 
have their version of the relevant facts published in one forum or anoth-
er. But this option is not very promising. First of all, in the current global 
reality, the state is obliged to interact not only with other states, but also 
with intergovernmental and supranational institutions, networks of regu-
lators, corporations, investors, NGOs, and so forth. This means that it is 
much more difficult for the state to locate the relevant actors and inform 
them of its position on a certain issue. 
Reaching global public opinion through the media is especially hard.202 
Here again, the fact that denials are not as exciting as the allegations pre-
ceding them is the primary obstacle to having the state’s reply published 
prominently in the commercial press. To the extent that governments 
reply to defamatory accusations against them in state-owned newspapers 
or on television stations, such outlets are unlikely to obtain sufficient 
exposure to foreign publics in order to effectively negate the impact of 
previous negative reports. Responding on news websites or official state 
websites is not generally helpful either, given the above-mentioned  
characteristics of the internet. 
                                                                                                             
 197. See Levi, supra note 140, at 1104–05; Perzanowski, supra note 155, at 850–51, 
862. 
 198. MCCOMBS, supra note 130, at 147–48. 
 199. See Peled, supra note 91, at 53. 
 200. MCCOMBS, supra note 130, at 147–48.  
 201. See Magarian, supra note 191, at 889; Peled, supra note 91, at 53. 
 202. Saleem, supra note 151, at 138–39. 
144 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:1 
States do not have a right of reply vis-à-vis publishers of defamatory 
content. The laws of common law countries do not grant a right of reply 
even to natural persons.203 Though many civil law systems do recognize 
such a norm, it is rarely enjoyed by governments—let alone foreign 
ones—as they are normally not deemed to have a legal right to reputation 
in the first place.204 And as to ethical standards, which often impose a 
general duty to publish a reply in appropriate cases, they rarely bind the 
press.205 
The assumption that self-help is effective is particularly questionable 
with regard to less-developed states, which lack the communication  
capabilities to effectively compete globally through public diplomacy 
and to disseminate their positions and viewpoints worldwide.206 
Finally, even where states succeed in disseminating their versions of 
the facts, another crucial problem emerges: a reply has limited ability to 
persuade the public of the falsity of the defamatory charges and to rem-
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edy reputational harm,207 since it is necessarily perceived as biased.208 In 
particular, publics often mistrust communications by governments.209 As 
Wang notes: 
The credibility and efficacy of the government, as the primary commu-
nicator, is now often suspected, because people tend to perceive com-
munication by a foreign government as political propaganda. Without 
source credibility, no amount of communication and information will 
ever be effective and, worse, could even be counter-productive.210 
V. AN INTERNATIONAL VERSION OF DEFAMATION LAW: EVALUATING 
PLAUSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 
As the foregoing analysis indicates, it is reasonable to assume that the 
“marketplace of ideas” relating to international affairs fails to guarantee 
the accuracy of the information disseminated worldwide about states. 
This Article has also shown that the potential consequences of such mar-
ket failures are serious. It is therefore justified to endow states with a 
legal right to reputation, and to devise institutional and procedural in-
struments to give effect to such a right. At the same time, special care 
must be taken to prevent excessive harm to actors involved directly or 
indirectly in the international political debate, in order not to chill the 
invaluable exchange of information and opinions. Regulation of the cru-
cial and sensitive realm of speech is justified only insofar as its costs do 
not exceed its benefits. 
Designing a detailed international libel regime is a complex task that 
exceeds the scope of the present framework. Instead, the following Part 
will briefly discuss several plausible courses of action, rule out some, 
and call for further examination of others. 
Two theoretical alternatives may be dismissed at the outset. First,  
establishing a cause of action for state defamation in domestic laws by 
virtue of a multilateral agreement is ineffective, unrealistic, and undesir-
able. The main problem with this approach is the difficulty of adjudicat-
ing events that took place far away from the forum of the court, especially 
when understanding the issues at hand requires on-site examinations, 
questioning of individuals located abroad, overcoming language barriers, 
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or comprehending intricate political contexts. Thus, from the perspective 
of the defamed state and the international community, this approach 
would often fail to meet the goal of declaring the true nature of situations 
and events. From the forum state’s perspective, substantial judicial re-
sources would be expended with no real returns, and political tensions 
with applicant states might arise. And from the media’s perspective, evi-
dentiary hardships would yield high litigation costs. Coupled with the 
questionable prospects of proving the accuracy of journalistic reports in 
court and the limited interest of most media consumers in foreign affairs, 
such hardships could produce a chilling effect and reduce the scope and 
depth of foreign news reporting. Finally, forum shopping may be ex-
pected. A state defamed by a report disseminated in more than one state 
would be tempted to sue in a country friendly to it in terms of political 
orientation and convenient in terms of applicable law—perhaps even on 
a reciprocal basis—thereby turning such a domestic-level regime into a 
farce. 
Second, holding states responsible for defamatory communications 
published by private actors within their territories211—which would imp-
ly that governments should exert tough oversight over the work of the 
media and might actually induce them to do so—does not coincide with 
the modern conception of freedom of the press. 
Two additional proposals will now be discussed in greater detail. 
A. Option 1: Reviving and Modifying the CIRC 
In the realm of private law, it is often contended that publication of a 
defamed individual’s reply to the allegations against him or her, if it has 
merits and is well phrased, is capable of reducing the libel’s influence on 
listeners.212 The idea that reply properly redresses reputational harm213 is 
supported by psychological research214 and by the fact that European de-
famation and media laws provide for a right of reply.215 A right of reply 
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also raises the quality of public debate by allowing media consumers to 
critically evaluate the reports to which they are exposed.216 
By analogy, a plausible remedy for defamation targeting states could 
be to enable them to present their positions in response to disparaging 
publications in a way that reaches the public. 
The formation of a legal regime that would compel private media out-
lets throughout the world to provide states with a right of reply—which 
is a theoretically powerful device for protecting states’ reputations—is 
highly impractical,217 and might pose a grave threat to the editorial  
autonomy of the press.218 A more reasonable alternative is to establish 
mechanisms to facilitate the delivery of the defamed state’s response to 
relevant international audiences. This is precisely the objective of the 
CIRC, but as discussed in Part II, supra, the CIRC’s means of achieving 
it are deficient.219 The CIRC could become more effective—and thus 
more appealing to states—if the existing procedure, which relies on the 
discretion and limited mass communication resources of the UN Secre-
tary-General, were improved. For instance, state parties could create an 
international forum accessible worldwide through the internet and possibly 
by additional means, in which states’ manifestos would be published. 
However, any instrument for an international right of reply would face 
two inherent problems, both discussed supra. First, given the preferences 
of modern media consumers, designing a forum for replies that would 
attract sufficient public attention is hardly an easy task. Second, the utili-
ty of states’ replies is cast in serious doubt since many would view such 
replies as untrustworthy political propaganda.220 
B. Option 2: Establishing a Standing International Fact-Finding Com-
mission 
Many commentators believe that reputational harm can be effectively 
cured if an impartial, official institution enjoying public trust and re-
spect—typically a court—were to thoroughly examine the pertinent facts 
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and declare that the defamatory imputations are untrue.221 Declaratory 
relief is thus compatible both with the principal desire of defamed  
individuals222 (as indicated by empirical research)223 in restoring their 
reputations, and with society’s interest in correcting false information 
circulated in the public domain.224 Moreover, confining the remedy for 
defamation to a declaratory judgment removes the major chiller of press 
freedom, namely, publishers’ risks of being subject to significant damag-
es awards.225 Against this background, various legislative and academic 
proposals have been raised to institute a declaratory judgment procedure 
within U.S. defamation law.226 
A comparable mechanism could arguably be adopted in the interna-
tional sphere. As the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)227 and the  
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International Law Commission228 have recognized, declaration by a 
competent tribunal of the wrongfulness of an act is a legitimate remedy 
for nonmaterial harm. In addition, there is an increasing understanding 
that the resolution of international “disputes arising predominantly from 
a difference of opinion on facts [may be facilitated] by elucidating these 
facts.”229 
The task of examining the accuracy of defamatory publications should 
be entrusted to an institution with such features and processes as would 
ensure maximum professionalism, efficiency, and fairness to all actors 
involved. The ICJ does not appear to be an ideal candidate for such an 
assignment. First, the ICJ’s jurisdiction only extends to contentious cases 
between states230 and advisory opinions pursuant to the request of UN 
organs.231 Suing states for defamation published by the private media 
within their territories, as explained above, is not a suitable framework 
for resolving international defamation disputes, and UN organs cannot 
always be relied upon to act when appropriate. And, second, the ICJ is 
often criticized for having questionable fact-finding capabilities and 
practices.232 
Alternatively, international bodies addressing human rights issues 
could potentially vindicate states’ unjustly tarnished reputations in the 
course of their routine work of investigating reports of human rights 
abuses. However, the UN human rights institutions, notably the Human 
Rights Council, are claimed to be heavily influenced by political consid-
erations.233 In addition, such institutions are highly dependent upon in-
formation supplied by NGOs, which is not infrequently inaccurate.234 
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Finally, not all defamatory content pertaining to states concerns human 
rights issues. 
As no other existing body seems suitable for administering internation-
al libel law, a plausible solution is to form a new institution designated 
specifically for that purpose. Such an institution probably should not be a 
court in the traditional sense. Any institution whose operation is largely 
or exclusively confined to its physical territory is bound to have serious 
difficulties in independently ascertaining the facts of remote conflicts.235 
Instead, inspiration may be drawn from fact-finding commissions in par-
ticular regimes. Such commissions were established, for instance, by  
Article 90 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts;236 Article 1 of the European Convention for the  
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment;237 Article 26 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities;238 and Article 33 of the Convention on the Law of 
the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.239 These com-
missions are authorized to engage in active information gathering and to 
conduct onsite visits,240 which significantly enhance their fact-finding 
capabilities. Under additional rules that apply to at least some of these 
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commissions, states are obliged to give them access to any site relevant 
to their mandate,241 to provide them with necessary information,242 to 
allow them to hold closed meetings with relevant parties,243 and to grant 
their members immunity from legal process of any kind.244 The commis-
sions on torture and on minority rights fulfill their fact-finding roles and 
routinely issue reports in their respective fields.245 
In this Article’s context, the fact-finding commission would conduct 
factual investigation at the request of a state seeking to refute specific 
defamatory content, and would publish its findings. As the objective of 
the procedure would be to determine the facts rather than to punish the 
defamers, the latter would not be defendants, nor would they be subject 
to any duty or sanction even if the commission found for the applicant 
state. Furthermore, the commission’s holding that the defamatory 
charges are false would not prevent anyone from insisting thereafter that 
the charges were nevertheless accurate. While ordinary individuals tend 
to attribute importance to judicial and quasi-judicial decisions and thus 
consider them reliable, they presumably recognize that judges and com-
parable fact-finders might err, and they would not be immune to persua-
sion that such is the case with respect to a given dispute.246 Thus, the 
commission’s findings are expected to be useful in bettering the appli-
cant state’s image, but at the same time, the findings could foster subse-
quent global public discourse. 
Though the lack of an adversarial process might look like a recipe for 
the commission’s “capture” by the interests and resources of the appli-
cant state, this outcome is avoidable. Any dispute involving a state  
necessarily involves additional actors with opposing interests and views, 
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be they other countries, domestic minority groups, peoples under bellige-
rent occupation, NGOs, media outlets that previously published relevant 
reports about the state, and the like. These actors could provide the 
commission with information in support of their respective stances and 
should be allowed to do so. Such actors in fact compete currently to in-
fluence international public opinion, but the failures they generate in the 
unregulated international marketplace of ideas are likely to decrease if all 
the available information is processed within the confines of neutral and 
professionalized procedures. The relevant actors’ levels of cooperation 
with the commission may also be mentioned in the commission’s report, 
especially if the behavior of the actors prevents the commission from 
reaching conclusive findings.247 Such obstruction could occur, for in-
stance, if the applicant state or another state, authority, or organization 
involved were to prohibit the commission’s entry to certain places, limit 
its access to certain documents, or bar its communication with certain 
groups. 
Within the definition of the commission’s competence, as clear a line 
as possible must be drawn between political value judgments, which may 
not be adjudicated, and assertions of objective fact, which may. Though 
that distinction, as well as the determination of truth and falsity, is hardly 
an easy task, the analogy to domestic defamation laws—under which the 
distinctions between fact and opinion, and between truth and falsehood, 
are essential elements248—indicates that it is achievable. An equally im-
portant effort should be made to distinguish between allegations pertain-
ing to relatively concrete events, which ought to be the sole subject of the 
defamation process, and publications providing professional analysis of 
complex political or economic situations, the evaluation of which cannot 
possibly lead to conclusive and unequivocal results. For similar practical 
reasons, it might be advisable to confine international libel law to certain 
kinds of reputations, relating, for instance, to law observance and moral 
behavior, as opposed to military or financial strength. 
Many other issues will also have to be addressed. For instance, with 
regard to substantive law, the regime must define the nature and extent of 
the required link between an applicant state and the defamation com-
plained of that would trigger the fact-finding process. Among the institu-
tional issues that arise is the fact-finding commission’s composition. The 
members of the commission should be elected in a way that would both 
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guarantee the commission’s professionalism, and satisfy states’ pre-
sumed desires to maintain control of the election process, thereby en-
hancing the commission’s legitimacy and the degree of cooperation it 
elicits. At least some of the commission’s members should be reputable 
journalists. Finally, with regard to procedure, the commission must be 
equipped with all the tools necessary to gather and evaluate materials 
effectively and to avoid dependence on the information supplied by in-
terested parties. In addition, the status of the defamer in the process 
should be defined, and mechanisms should be formed to ensure that the 
commission’s reports obtain adequate publicity and attention worldwide. 
These issues and many more will have to wait for further research. 
CONCLUSION 
The idea of endowing states with a legal right to reputation certainly 
seems odd at first glance. But upon exploring the concept of reputation 
and understanding the individual and collective interests that justify its 
protection under domestic laws, it becomes clear that reputation is as 
valuable to states and the international community as it is to individuals 
and the societies they live in. The law, which aims to regulate human 
affairs compatibly with the realities and needs of any given time, place, 
and context, should not ignore these observations. Considering that in-
ternational law is essentially an endeavor to build an organized society of 
actors that would try to imitate, to the extent feasible, the internal order 
prevailing in modern states, and given the fact that the array of issues 
international law treats is consistently expanding, it is plausible to add 
yet another segment to that legal fabric and to begin thinking about an 
international parallel to defamation law. 
This Article did not intend to present a complete account of the desira-
ble international libel law—quite the contrary, I recognize that the sug-
gested courses of action would be hard to implement and that the best 
solution may lie elsewhere. Rather, my purpose is to raise awareness of 
the importance of state reputation and to demonstrate that it is worthy of 
legal protection. If states and the international community as a whole 
begin to regard the interest in reputation as a right, they might be more 
determined to protect it. 
